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I. Introduction
Any dealing with a complex discipline like copyright requires
attention to the conceptual aura surrounding it. Copyright scholars
develop new concepts, reject existing ones and introduce into the
copyright playing field conflicting views and attitudes. We like, as
Waldron asserts "to keep our armory of concepts in good shape"' in
order to defend our personal understanding and claim that those of
others lack clarity. In this article we propose to examine the nature of
copyright as a "concept" and discuss the benefits that can be derived
from understanding copyright as a vague conceptual framework, or,
alternatively as an arsenal of competing interpretations and
permutations, rendering its meaning "essentially contested."
Defining the conceptual basis in copyright is of vital importance for
every discussion on copyright laws and policy. In the words of Garon:
"[u]nless there is a valid conceptual basis for copyright laws, there can
be no fundamental immorality in refusing to be bound by them... 2
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Boston University, School of Law; Lecturer in Law,
University of Leicester, England. I am indebted to Leslie Green for insightful and
constructive comments of this Article. The ideas developed in this Article benefited
greatly from discussions and comments provided on earlier drafts of this Article by Wendy
J Gordon, David Vaver, Mary Jane Mossman, Carys Craig, Abraham Drassinower,
Rosemary Coombe, Leslie Jacobs, Joshua Getzler, and David Freedman.
1. Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in
Florida)?', 21 J.L & PHIL. 137, 138 (2002) [hereinafter Waldron].
2. Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright
Philosophy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1283 (2003).
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II. Defining Level of Abstraction: "Concept" or "Conception"
Philosophers sometimes distinguish between "concepts" and
"conceptions" as analytical tools. Dworkin takes fairness as an
example of a concept and explains: "The difference is a difference not
just in the detail of the instructions given but the kind of instructions
given. When I appeal to the concept of fairness I appeal to what
fairness means, and I give my views on that issue no special standing.
When I lay down a conception of fairness, I lay down what I mean by
fairness, and my view is therefore the heart of the matter. When I
appeal to fairness I pose a moral issue; when I lay down my
conception of fairness I try to answer it."' 3 In other words, the
distinction between concept and conception concerns levels of
abstraction. The concept of "X" is more general, more abstract and
does not tell us what "X" requires in particular circumstances. The
concept, however, may have an inherent complexity.
Hart, for example, argues that there is "certain complexity in the
structure of the idea of justice."4 Justice is an abstract idea which to
many would mean maintaining or restoring a certain balance or
proportion. A central element in the way we perceive justice is
"[t]reat like cases alike; though we need to add to the latter and treat
different cases differently."5 But this remains an empty form unless
we understand that "any set of human beings will resemble each
other in some respects and differ from each other in others."6 We
have to identify elements of resemblance and elements of difference.
This is a crucial point since without identifying these elements "we
cannot proceed to criticize laws or other social arrangements as
unjust."7 Treating justice as a general abstract concept, according to
Hart, means that the concept consists of two parts: "[A] uniform or
constant feature, summarized in the precept 'Treat like cases alike'
and a shifting or varying criterion used in determining when, for any
given purpose, cases are alike or different. In this respect justice is
like the notions of what is genuine, or tall, or warm, which contains an
implicit reference to a standard which varies with the classification of
the thing to which they are applied., 8
3. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 135 (1977).
4. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 160 (2d ed. 1994).
5. Id. at 159.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 160.
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It can be argued that a concept reflects a general abstract idea,
an uncontroversial idea or principle, or the agreement people share
that the concept X exists. The conceptions of X reflect different views
of the concept.9 They take X to denote a parent concept from which
competing conceptions may emerge. A good example Dworkin uses is
the way courts apply the Constitution, and "if courts try to be faithful
to the Constitution, they will for that very reason be forced to decide
between competing conceptions of political morality. '
We normally tend to agree on the "concept," yet disagree on the
detailed "conception" because we see things differently. "Justice" is a
concept, but its applicability to copyright admits of many different
conceptions. Rawls employs the concept/conception paradigm and
tells us that its greatest benefit is in helping us to map competing
applications of a given concept. The "distinction between concept and
the various conceptions of justice settles no important questions. It
simply helps to identify the role of the principles of social justice.""
Rawls believes that people radically differ in respect of their
conception of the good life and remarks:
Men disagree about which principles should define the basic terms
of their association. Yet we may still say, despite this disagreement,
that they each have a conception of justice ... a characteristic set of
principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining
what they take to be the proper distribution of the benefits and
burdens of social cooperation. Thus it seems natural to think of the
concept of justice as distinct from the various conceptions of justice
and as being specified by the role which these different sets of
principles, these different conceptions, have in common.
12
Property is a good example of a concept around which
competing conceptions of entitlements and their limits contend. 3 We
share an agreement on the existence of property as a concept but it
does not tell us how property is understood in particular situations.
That is, we tend to agree on the general concept, but disagree on its
conceptions. Conceptions of property play a decisive role in copyright
9. In DIVERSITY: THE INVENTION OF A CONCEPT, Wood argues that we are not
free people who chart the direction we chose to go. Wood's attempt is an example of
common confusion between "concept" and "conception": his book is not to construct a
"concept" but to invent a "conception" of the existing concept "diversity," and claim that
society's diversity is defined by us being members of a social group - creatures of the
historical evolution of these groups. PETER WOOD, DIVERSITY: THE INVENTION OF A
CONCEPT (2003).
10. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 136 (emphasis added).
11. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 5 (Oxford University Press 1999) (1971).
12. Id.
13. Although no universally accepted theory of property has been constructed, most
philosophical speculations affirm the existence of property.
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debates. Ideals of property affect ideals of copyright. Just as property
can be justified as a derivation from labour, desert, liberty, utility,
efficiency, personality and human nature, 4 so copyright is justifiable
on grounds of utility, labour, personality, social and institutional
planning, authorial constructionism and social constructionism. The
competing conceptions of the appropriate scope of copyright
acknowledge the existence of a concept.
In recent works on property, Harris and Underkuffler offer
different accounts, to some extent competing, of the concept of
property. Neither denies that the concept of property exists and has a
recognisable general meaning, but each devises conceptions
representing different approaches regarding the definition and
regulation of property. For Harris the institution of property is
composed of "the twin notions of trespassory rules and the ownership
spectrum."'5 He explains:
By 'trespassory rules' is meant any social rules, whether or not
embodied in law, which purport to impose obligations on all
members of society, other than an individual or group who is taken
to have some form of open-ended relationship to a thing, not to
make use of that thing without the consent of the individual or
group. The most hallowed such trespassory rule embodies the
commandment 'thou shalt not steal'.. .By 'the ownership spectrum'
is meant the open-ended relationships presupposed and protected
by trespassory rules. All attempts in the history of theorizing about
property to provide an univocal explication of the concept of
ownership, applicable within all societies and to all resources, have
failed. Yet, property talk, lay and legal, deploys ineliminable
ownership conceptions.
16
Harris argues that both conceptions explain the concept of
property. Underkuffier challenges Harris's conceptions.17 She defines
the concept of property as "a general legal matter"18 governed by two
conceptions: (i) the "common conception" which defines the rights of
the individual, separated from the communal sphere and securing the
individual's private autonomy against collective interests; 9 and (ii)
the "operative conception" in which property performs a weaker
function. This conception represents individuals' rights fluid in time
14. Carter's examination of property is a good example of how property is a concept
justifiable through competing conceptions. ALLEN CARTER, THE PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989).
15. J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 5 (1996).
16. Id.
17. LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MAKING AND POWER
37-63, 132-34 (2003).
18. Id. at 54.
19. Id. at 38-46.
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and mutable as circumstances dictate, in order to account for the
general public welfare." Underkuffler also argues that both
conceptions are necessary in order to reach a coherent understanding
of the concept of property, and to find a balance within that concept.
Underkuffler presents two conceptions of property and considers
Harris' twin conceptions to have only one general meaning which
parallels the "common conception" she advocates. She writes: "by
defining ownership as an 'open-ended set of prima facie use-
privileges [and] control powers,' Harris represents a particular
conception of property (the 'common' conception of property) as, in
fact, the only one., 21 It seems that Underkuffler's criticism of Harris
and formulation of two conceptions of property, reaffirms the
inherent employment of the concept/conception paradigm in her
argument:
The different conceptions of property that we have identified
provide radically different protection for individual interests under
legal guarantee such as the Taking Clause. If the common
conception of property is used, individual interests are afforded
strict protection. If the operative conception is used, individual
interests are - as a practical matter - afforded none.
Our choice of a conception of property is not, in short, a simply
'descriptive' or 'neutral' one. We determine - through our choice of
a conception of property - what is assumed and what is not, what is
'radical' and what is not, what is presumptively legitimate and what
is not, what is 'owed' (as a normative matter) to the individual and
what is not.22
The agreement people share on the existence of property as a
general concept is precisely the agreement they share on copyright.
The concept of copyright exists and has a common framework in
which it operates. But the manner in which it is developed or
regulated is subject to many conflicting views. In other words, there is
no dispute that the institution of copyright exists, but, as Sterling
observes, it "means many things to many people. To some it signifies
a component of the rights of man, deriving from natural law and
sustaining the work of the human mind by protecting authors in
respect of all uses of their works. To others it represents a
commercially inspired monopoly for the better regulation of the
exploitation of the author's work in the market place." 23 That is, any
attempt to introduce a conclusive conception of copyright is
20. Id. at 46-51.
21. Id. at 60. For further illustration on the application of the concept/conception to
"ownership," see JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 47-53 (1988).
22. Id. at 61-63.
23. J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW ix (1998).
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notoriously elusive. As a system that has to balance between the
individual's proprietary interests and society's interests, it is
ubiquitous and complex, socially and economically important, and
thus deemed controversial.
Just as there is an almost indefinite number of conceptions of the
good life, there are many conceptions of the concept "just copyright"
amongst authors, consumers, academics and legislators." The simple
reason, in Madison's words, lies in the fact that "copyright doctrine
suggests stories of artists, artisans, tradespeople, and industries with
different and overlapping interests, all expressed through the prism of
a single body of law."25 If copyright is composed of various
conceptions, copyright, as a "concept," is open for great challenges.
We shall not press the concept/conception paradigm any further, but
rather pose another question which is a variation on this theme: is
copyright an essentially contested concept?
III. Gallie's Ideal of Essential Contestability
Gallie coined the term "essentially contested concept" according
to which, there are certain concepts, such as art and democracy, "the
proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their
proper uses on the part of their users., 26 Property, for example, as
Dagan asserts: "is too controversial and has too many manifestations
and configurations.. .Property is an essentially contested concept that
24. It is important to clarify that copyright can be used as a conception where
property is the concept, and property can be used as a conception where justice, equality
or democracy are the concepts. In this work I concentrate on copyright as a concept and
analyse the rival conceptions that it generates.
25. Michael J. Madison, Comment: Where Does Creativity Come From? And Other
Stories of Copyright, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747, 748 (2003).
26. W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN
SOC'Y 167, 169 (1955-56). Hampshire used a similar idiom referring to "essentially
questionable and corrigible concepts," according to which, there are "some concepts that
are permanently and essentially subject to question and dispute and are recognised to be
at all times questionable," for example morality and politics. STUART HAMPSHIRE,
THOUGHT AND ACTION 230-31 (1959). For Gray, the contestability nature of concepts to
which Gallie and Hampshire refer is "consisted in its being somewhat inherently liable to
rival interpretations." John Gray, Political Power, Social Theory, and Essential
Contestability, in THE NATURE OF POLITICAL THEORY 75, 94 (David Miller & Larry
Siedentop eds., 1983). The concept "essential contestability" was also examined by many
others. For further illustration see: Alasdair MacIntyre, The Essential Contestability of
Some Social Concepts, 84 ETHICS 1 (1973); Eugene Garver, Essentially Contested
Concepts: the Ethics and Tactics of Argument, 23 PHIL. & RHETORIC 251 (1990); and R.
George Wright, Is Natural Law Theory of Any Use in Constitutional Interpretation?, 4 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 463, 479 (1995). Wright defines "essential contestable concepts" as
"inherently approachable from conflicting perspectives." Id.
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is open to competing interpretations and permutations. 2 ' Gallie
regarded a concept as "essentially contested" when it fulfils four main
conditions: (i) it must be a value-concept: "it must be appraisive in the
sense that it signifies or accredits some kind of valued achievement";'
(ii) the achievement has to be internally complex;29 (iii) "any
explanation of its worth must therefore include reference to the
respective contributions of its various parts or features;" and (iv) any
such achievement has to be 'open' in character"", i.e., to allow
considerable modifications that cannot be defined in advance. Gallie
adds condition (v) to the first four, which ensures that every person
recognises that his use of the concept is contested by his fellows'
conception; that to use an essentially contested concept means to use
it "both aggressively and defensively.
33
For Gallie "essential" means three things.' First, it indicates
contestation-to-the-core of the concept: the concept is furnished with
anomalies and disagreements which generate conceptual patterns that
stagger the very heart of the concept. Second, it requires
contestedness to serve part of the very essence of the concept in
27. Hanoch Dagan, The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 138, 147-48 (1999). Radin also labels "property" as an essentially contested concept.
Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1688 (1988).
28. Gallie, supra note 26, at 171.
29. Id. at 171-72.
30. Id. Gallie also adds the obvious condition (iiia): "Any essentially contested
concept is liable initially to be ambiguous," otherwise contestability cannot be maintained.
Id. at 172, n.1.
31. Id. at 172.
32. Id. Gallie also adds condition (iva) which holds that any such concept "is
persistently vague" simply because its use by one person would not guide all others to
follow suit. Id. at 172, n.1.
33. Id. at 172. Reitan explains Gallie's formula in the following way: "an essentially
contested concept is, for Gallie, a positive appraisal of an achievement. In other words,
there is a common value judgement that attaches to all objects that fall within the
concept's extension: to be such an object is to have achieved something significant
(consider the concept 'art')." Eric Reitan, Rape as an Essentially Contested Concept,, 16(2)
HYPATIA 43, 48 (2001). Garver, taking the example of violence, contends that the
appraisal, which an essentially contested concept embodies, does not need to be positive.
Newton Garver, Violence and Social Order, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, POLITICS, AND
SOCIOLOGY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH INTERNATIONAL WITTGENSTEIN SYMPOSIUM
220 (1988), cited in Reitan, supra.
34. See also Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical
Issues, 82(3) CAL. L. REV. 509, 529-31 (1994) [hereinafter Waldron]. Here Waldron offers
a useful interpretive guide to certain perplexing legal concepts, and clears up some
confusion. He deals mainly with ambiguity, vagueness and contestability and examines the
advantageous interplay between these concepts and the ways in which laws are applied
and developed.
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question. And third, in the absence of the component "essential," the
concept may lack sufficient contestability and may lose its "open"
character. I will illustrate with an example from copyright. The
European Database Directive shook the concept of database to the
core. It has introduced a dual system for database protection:
copyright and sui generis 5 For person P1, database definition D, in
the European Directive is a 'monstrous caricature of true intellectual
property laws'36 while for P, for example, a private undertaking, D2
means a novel step towards better protection for economic
investments. This does not prevent P3 from putting forward a D 3 and
claim to have found a mid-way conception. But if P3 says "I do not
understand why people find it difficult to understand the meaning of
database protection in the Directive; after all there is one clear
meaning of the concept", it indicates that he himself does not
understand the inherent complexity recognised in the field of
database protection, i.e., the implications from jurisdictional
differences and the endless controversies concerning what copyright
should not protect 7
Two additional conditions form the core of Gallie's articulated
conceptual test: (vii) the availability of an original exemplar and (viii)
sustainability and adaptability of the former by virtue of continuous
competition between the contestant users of the concept.38 An
exemplar is a specific, concrete, template that serves as a single
generally acknowledged tradition to follow. An example is a style of
35. Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal
Protection of Databases (11 March 1996). For brief overview see GUY TRITrON,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE 356-64 (2d ed. 2002).
36. J.H. Reichman and Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights or Data?, 50
VAND. L. REv. 51, 164 (1997).
37. The ample scholarship written on the protection of databases in the European
Union, whether from the perspective of economics, trade, or from the constitutional
perspective, shows how contestable its nature is. See e.g., Mark Powell, The European
Union's Database Directive: An International Antidote to the Side Effects of Feist?, 20
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1215 (1997); Mark Schneider, The European Union Database
Directive, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 551 (1998); Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of
Database Protection: the Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private
Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535 (2000); Neeta Thakur, Database
Protection in the European Union and the United States: The European Database Directive
as an Optimum Global Model, 1 INTELL. PROP. Q. 100 (2001); Julie Wald, Legislating the
Golden Rule: Achieving Comparable Protection Under the European Union Database
Directive, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 987 (2002); Rebecca Lubens, Survey of Developments
in European Database Protection, (2003) 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 447 (2003); Mark J.
Davison and P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Football Fixtures, Horseraces and Spin Offs: The ECJ
Domesticates the Database Right, 27(3) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 113 (2005).
38. Gallie illustrates using the concepts of art, democracy, social justice and religion.
Gallie, supra note 26, at 180-87.
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playing ice hockey that established a tradition of ways to play the
game but is recognised as the original template from which this
tradition has evolved. Put simply, an exemplar requires that the
specific method of playing ice hockey derive from a single, generally
acknowledged exemplar. Yet, the "open character" of the concept
dictates that the application of the exemplar may differ from team to
team.39 This means that it would seem to be quite impossible to fix a
general principle for deciding which of two teams plays best. In
Gallie's words:
[B]ecause of the internally complex and variously describable
character of the exemplar's play, it is natural that different features
in it should be differently weighted by different appraisers, and
hence that our different teams should have come to hold their very
different conceptions of how the game should be played. To this we
should add that recognition or acceptance of the exemplar's
achievement must have that "open" character which we have
ascribed to every essentially contested concept.. .To follow an
exemplar is to exert oneself to revive its (or his) way of doing
things, not only to the utmost of one's ability, but to the utmost that
circumstances, favourable or unfavourable, will allow.4°
Against Gallie, Waldron, examining the meaning of the "Rule of
Law," claims that an exemplar may not always be necessary.
Situations arise in which no exemplar exists, but just a problem with
which our social and political institutions grappled for thousands of
years (or a principle which scholars are constantly debating). And this
problem renders the "Rule of Law" "a solution-concept rather than
an achievement concept; it is the concept to a solution to a problem
we're not sure how to solve; and rival conceptions are rival proposals
for solving it or rival proposals for doing the best we can in this regard
given that the problem is insoluble.,
42
It appears that Waldron recognises two types of disputes:
disputes that neatly conform to Gallie's thesis and disputes that do
not. Waldron argues that "reference back to an exemplar may be too
narrow an account of what makes a contested concept nevertheless a
39. Id. at 177.
40. Id. at 176-77.
41. Waldron defines Gallie's idea as follows: "the key to Gallie's idea of essential
contestability seems to be a combination of normativity and complexity: only normative
concepts with certain internal complexity are capable of being essentially contested."
Waldron, supra note 1, at 150.
42. Id. at 158. Waldron raises another difficulty with Gallie's argument. For Gallie,
essential contestability enriches our understanding of a given concept. Waldron claims
that disputation can make things better regardless of whether people associate that with
the idea of essential contestability. Id. at 163.
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shared concept." 3 We should not always look for an exemplar which
''may emerge in the course of discussion ... rather than as a
foundation that makes the argument possible in the first place"" and
the emergence of fruitful arguments "are signs that a conceptual
contestation is fruitful, rather than explanations of its fruitfulness.,
45
Gallie himself is aware of this criticism and remarks that it may
sometimes be difficult to comply with the condition of exemplar. In
his discussion on the concept of art he suggests that instead of
insisting on a particular exemplar, "it is fairly easy to see what
particular artistic tradition or set of traditions is being regarded as the
'exemplar term'. ' 46
IV. Art, Copyright, and the Value of Essential Contestability
Art is one of the concepts Gallie uses to illustrate his conceptual
paradigm.4 ' He claims that the concept "art" satisfies conditions (i)-
(v) rather easily: its daily uses makes it appraisive; its achievements -
works of art - are always internally complex; its achievements are
controversial and invite an indefinite number of descriptions; every
artistic achievement is always "open in character" since it allows
modifications but no one can predict which form of art will develop
and in what direction; artists and their admirers agree that the
concept "art" is used both aggressively and defensively. Gallie,
however, casts doubt on whether "art" may satisfy the condition of
exemplar, because there is not one artistic tradition that can apply to
the general concept "art." He claims that there can be different
traditions, each of which may satisfy an "exemplar term." 8
Moreover, given the eclectic nature of artistic activities, tastes and
viewpoints, "art" may easily satisfy the remaining condition of
plausibility and sustainability.
49
If Gallie finds the concept "art" to satisfy conditions (i)-(viii),
can this diagnosis apply to copyright? I contend that, just as Green
43. Waldron, supra note 34 at 533.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Gallie, supra note 26, at 182-83.
47. Id. at 181-183. See also, Waldron, supra note 34, at 530-31.
48. Gallie, supra note 26, at 182.
49. For Rushton, dealing with "art" in this context is a "problem" since the lack of
one definition imposes barriers on an agreement of what art is and is not. He contends,
that the courts may not be the right place to define "art" and perhaps there is even no
need for a definition. See Michael Rushton, An Economic Approach to Copyright in
Works of Artistic Craftsmanship, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 255, 268 (2001).
[28:101HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
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argues that the concept "good citizenship" is complex and contested, °
the concept "just copyright" constitutes a classic example of a concept
that fully complies with Gallie's formula. From the theoretical
discussion in the previous Chapter, and the ongoing debate by
scholars on which of the theories best ensures a better balance
between public and private interests, there is no doubt that copyright
is a contested concept which embraces many conflicting views of the
proper balance in copyright. As for Gallie's conditions: (i) our daily
use of the term "just copyright," and the value we attach to
copyrighted products make it appraisive - a value-concept; (ii) for the
many different perceptions of copyright, it is an intrinsically complex
discipline that produces and protects complex entities. For example,
judging copyright is not as straightforward as arguing whether my
shirt today is red or blue; (iii) it is variously describable in the sense
that its evaluation refers to the respective contributions of its various
elements; (iv) no one will dispute that it is constantly evolving and
that it is amenable to resolutions and modifications, i.e., it is "highly
open in character"; (v) every person, whether an author or a user,
recognises that his use of the concept is contested by others'
conceptions and will use the term both defensively and aggressively.
This disposes of Gallie's conditions (i)-(v).
There is something to be said about conditions (iii) and (iv).
What parameters should we consider when we ask how to judge
whether copyright is an internally complex concept and whether it is
open and unpredictable in character? A definition of complexity is
not necessary here simply because the vast discourse on how to
approach copyright, whether from utility, desert or personality, and
its many internal conflicts, such as exceptions to the right or its
duration, testify to this concept's complexity and openness." For
example, the recent inclusion of intellectual property in the draft
European Constitution introduces a new conception of copyright:
50. LESLIE GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 195 (1990).
51. As Madison remarks: in copyright "complexity considerations may be applied in a
variety of ways. In fair use doctrine, for example, the factor-driven statutory framework is
a helpful beginning, but it remains subject to being hijacked by arguments that
'commercial' reuse is presumptively unfair. The so-called 'transformative' use doctrine is a
healthy tonic, but one that is liable to misapplication and overemphasis on its own terms.
The scope of copyright in computer programs should likely be reconsidered, as well as
such issues as the term of copyright, and the extent which copyright law should pre-empt
equivalent rights under state law. Not all of these directly implicate the First Amendment
itself, but they do play important roles in the shape and structure - the architecture - of
copyright, and complexity lies within them as well as in fair use and the public domain."
Michael J. Madison, Complexity and Copyright in Contradiction, 18 CARDOzO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 125, 172-73 (2000).
20061
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52copyright (and property) as a European constitutional guarantee.
Hence, copyright's complexity is anything but static. In fact, it was
recently argued that if the European Union is an essentially contested
concept than "its Constitution represents the paradigm of
contestability."53 This has a direct effect on the many new principles
embedded in the Constitution, including intellectual property.
If the concept "just copyright" satisfies Gallie's model, what can
be identified as its exemplar? It is fairly easy to decide on a moment
in the history of copyright which established a tradition followed by
every common law jurisdiction. The Statute of Anne of 1709
constitutes an appropriate exemplar for copyright from which
disputes, competing aspirations and reforms have emerged. Anglo-
American copyright law recognises the authority of the Statute of
Anne as the first copyright law, and the original, specific, and
concrete template to follow. Even French copyright law, recognised
as the world's leading proponent of moral rights, is argued to be a
reflection of the Statute of Anne. As Peeler remarks: "The first
French copyright law was enacted in 1793 and was likely modelled
after England's Statute of Anne and the Copyright Act of May 1790,
which was America's first copyright act. ' 4 Although in early modern
French copyright law moral rights predominate over the traditional
economic approach to copyright, the ambiguous distinction between
moral and economic reassures that it has envisioned copyright in
similar terms to those of its Anglo-American predecessors, namely,
securing economic incentives.5
52. Article 11-17(2), Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (adopted by
consensus by the European Convention on 13 June and 10 July 2003) 18 July 2003; cf
Article 295 Treaty Establishing the European Community (ECT).
53. Michael Wilkinson, Constituting Europe: Flexibility or Finalit6, 22 OXFORD J. OF
LEGAL STUD. 177,177-78 (2002). See also Zenon Bankowski and Emilios Christodoulidis,
The European Union as an Essentially Contested Project, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
ITS ORDER 17 (Zenon Bankowski & Andrew Scott eds., 2000).
54. Calvin D. Peeler, From the Providence of Kings to Copyrighted Things (and
French Moral Rights), 9 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 423, 429 (1999).
55. It is often claimed that Anglo-American copyright law and continental copyright
law were inspired by different interests - that the former concentrates on instrumentalism
while the latter on authors' natural rights. Ginsburg convincingly refutes the contrast
between the two systems and argues that it is exaggerated. She finds that both systems
view authorial ownership from the perspective of the public good and only to the extent
that ownership patterns in artistic and authorial creations will inspire and promote the
public good. Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in
Revolutionary France and America, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON
COPYRIGHT LAW 131 (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994) 131. Following recent
legislative developments in Europe, the distinction seems to blur even more. See Kamiel J.
Koleman, Copyright Law and Economics in the EU Copyright Directive: Is the Droit
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The Act from 1709 reads: "An Act for the Encouragement of
Learning, by vesting the Copies of printed Books in the Authors, or
Purchasers, of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned.
'5 6
The English Act from 1988 follows the philosophical skeleton of the
Statute of Anne and provides a limited in time property right for
authors. 7 But more closely to the Statute of Anne, the US
Constitution empowers Congress 'to promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries. '58
Copyright's complexity is best defined by its obscure and
competing philosophical, as well as doctrinal, confusion. Copyright is
as an "essentially contested concept," uniquely describable and
universally acknowledged. 9  The exemplar's achievement -
recognition of proprietary rights in authorial and artistic entities, is
tied to another achievement: the need to strike a balance between
private rights and public interests. The "open character" of the
concept "copyright" dictates that application of the exemplar may,
like the ice hockey game, differ from one philosopher (and
jurisdiction) to another, just as philosophers' disagree on the balance
to strike between private and public in copyright. The continuous
competition between the various applications of the exemplar does
not justify any claim, but ensures that the concept remains contested.
Attempts to harmonize copyright standards may raise the
question whether we will ever reach an uncontested copyright
d'Auteur Pass?, 35(6) INT'L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 603 (2004).
56. The following examples confirm the place of the Statute of Anne as an exemplar
- the moment from which conceptions of modem copyright have started to emerge. See
HARRY RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE: AN ESSAY ON THE ACT FOR THE
ENCOURAGEMENT OF LEARNING 1709 (1956); Howard B. Abrams, The Historic
Foundations of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law
Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119 (1983); Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and
Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND
OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993); BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY,
THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1999); Daniel Burkitt,
Copyrighting Culture - The History and Cultural Specificity of the Western Model of
Copyright, 2 INTELL. PROP. Q. 146 (2001); RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE
RIGHT TO COPY: CHARTING THE MOVEMENT OF COPYRIGHT IN EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY BRITAIN (2004).
57. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, c. 48 (1988) (Eng.).
58. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl 8.
59. Gallie raises the interest in examining why a certain facet of an essentially
contested concept has a stronger appeal than another. That would include, Gallie asserts,
psychological, sociological and influences on a "person's or group's background, to explain
their present preferences and adherences." Gallie, supra note 26, at 192.
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system? Indeed, if all succumb to one vision, copyright would cease to
exist as an essentially contested concept. A segment of copyright
exemplar's legacy is the limited duration of the right. The European
Term Directive, extending the protection to 70 years after the death
of the author forced the US to come to terms with the new standard,
if its nationals are to receive reciprocal treatment in Europe. 60 The
Congress enacted the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998
(CTEA) adding 20 more years for copyright protection period.61 In
the recently decided Eldred v Ashcroft, the American Supreme Court
was asked to rule on the constitutionality of the Act.62 Justice
Ginsburg found that the Congress acted within its powers and that
"by extending the baseline United States copyright term to life plus
70 years, Congress sought to ensure that American authors would
receive the same copyright protection in Europe as their European
counterparts." 63 In contrast, Justice Stevens was not persuaded that
extension of the term was necessary and argues that extending terms
for existing copyrights neither induced an author to create new works,
nor did it support the public interest and the stability of the public
domain. 4 This disagreement shows the contestable nature of
copyright, and illustrates how the concept/conception paradigm
operates in copyright practice: while there was no dispute about that
the concept copyright exists, there was a disagreement on the
conception - how long should copyright last?
This attempt to harmonise the duration of copyright protection
did not end debates about the future of the duration. For example,
Lessig advocates a five-year renewable term65 and Landes and Posner
recently argued for "indefinitely renewable copyright." 66 This
reaffirms that copyright is not only an essentially contested concept,
but developments in the field of science and technology will
perpetuate its character as an "open concept., 67 The sustainability of
60. Council Directive 93/98, art. 1(1), 1993 O.J. (L 290).
61. See, Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203(a)(2), 301(c), 302, 303-
304 (2000)).
62. Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 183 (2003).
63. Id. at 204-08.
64. Id. at 240-41.
65. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 251-52 (2002).
66. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70
U. CHI. L. REv. 471 (2003). See also, Samuel L. Clemens, Copyright in Perpetuity, 6
GREEN BAG 109 (2d 2002).
67. Indeed, international harmonisation of intellectual property standards fuels
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competing views of copyright ensures that copyright remains "open in
character" - an "essentially contested concept."
To recapitulate, a "concept" provides the frame, such as justice,
liberty, property or copyright, while a "conception" refers to a
particular specification within that "concept." Conceptual inventions
in copyright maintain its diverse and open character. Copyright
controversies are not resolvable, and it seems that scholars will not
agree on any conception of copyright, bringing an end to the
concept's contested nature. As a concept, "copyright" is treated as the
general legal standard entrusted in recognising protection for authors,
artists, architects, craftsmen, lyricists and so on. Maintaining its open
character and contestable nature will ensure future improvements of
the concept of copyright and its capacity to meet unpredictable social
and cultural challenges.
Reitan applies Gallie's formula to the concept "rape" and
remarks that "... we should expect that as our cultural appreciation of
diverse perspectives evolves, the extension of the concept will expand
to reflect the deepened understanding of the moral landscape that
accompanies the introduction of new perspectives." ' Likewise, any
moral advances we may make in the domain of intellectual property
"will depend on our capacity to admit alternative voices into the
discussion, 69 of copyright. Meeting the challenge of copyright's
conceptual matrix will greatly contribute to the dialogue and the
evolution of its doctrinal principles. At the heart of Gallie's definition
is the belief that contestability can make the concept better.7°
Essential contestability allows multiple interpretations of a specific
concept that together allow to see the broader conceptual reach of
contestability. As Aoki observes: "The discourse of globalization collides with the
discourse of difference. Widely divergent concepts of property and ownership, originating
in extremely diverse political, economic, and social circumstances, provide the fuel for
hotly contested and seemingly unresolvable disputes." Keith Aoki, Considering Multiple
and Overlapping Sovereignties: Liberalism, Libertarianism, National Sovereignty, "Global"
Intellectual Property, and the Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 443, 462-63 (1998)
(emphasis added).
68. Reitan, supra note 33, at 21.
69. Id.
70. Maclntyre argues that certain legal institutions are not essentially contested. He
writes: "It is far from the case that all social concepts have the character of essential
contestability. Indeed some social concepts are only able to function as they do and to
have the range of application that they have because they lack essential contestability. A
legal-cum-economic system, for example, normally cannot function unless there is a kind
of agreement in definitions which precludes essential contestability. What counts as a
contract, what counts as a bill of exchange or a check, what determines the rate of
exchange between currencies must be fixed in a way that such concepts as those of
political party or tragic drama or education are not." Maclntyre, supra note 26, at 9.
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the concept. This has the capacity to make the concept a better
concept. Contestability, as Gray remarks, intends to "enrich
intellectual life and to promote tolerance within it'7' and highlight
misconceptions and flaws that would otherwise be left untouched. In
Gallie's words:
Recognition of a given concept as essentially contested implies
recognition of rival uses of it (such as oneself repudiates) as not
only logically possible and humanly "likely," but as of permanent
critical value to one's own use or interpretation of the concept in
question.. .One very desirable consequence of the required
recognition in any proper instance of essential contestedness might
therefore be expected to be a marked rising of the level of quality
of arguments in the disputes of the contestant parties.7
V. Conclusions
Literature on copyright shows that it is a unified concept with a
cluster of competing conceptions. However, it does not explicitly
refer to or draws benefits from the conceptual game in copyright. Our
tendency to search for the balance in copyright requires a clearer
conceptual base if it is ever to find its way within copyright's
definitional complexity. Unless we maintain the open character of
copyright, recognise the authority of the exemplar and the
importance of rethinking its effect on our understanding of copyright,
we are likely to keep expanding the illegitimate boundaries of
copyright. The best way to make meaningful progress in the way we
approach and think of copyright is by admitting into our discourse on
copyright alternative approaches to ownership which emphasizes the
public interest. In this way we will be able to protect the integrity of
the copyright discourse by ensuring that no single voice can exclude
other voices, and allow sufficient conceptual flexibility to permit open
discourse about the way we should approach and redefine the
entitlement structure in copyright.
71. John Gray, On Liberty, Liberalism and Essential Contestability, 8 BRIT. J. POL.
Sci. 385, 389 (1978). See also John Gray, On the Essential Contestability of Some Social
and Political Concepts, 5 POL. THEORY 331 (1977). Elsewhere he asks whether democracy
and morality are really disputes about concepts: "[Mjight they not be just quarrels about
the use of words?" He answers: "perhaps what we have is indeed meaning-variance rather
than competition in the use of a shared vocabulary." Gray, supra note 26, at 95.
72. Gallie, supra note 26, at 193. Waldron supports this argument. Waldron, supra
note 1, at 151-52.
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